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Libel and the First Amendment
Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
I. INTRODUCTION
The following item appeared in the December 22, 1967, issue
of Time Magazine:
Divorced. By Russell A. Firestone Jr., 41, heir to the tire for-
tune: Mary Alice Sullivan Firestone, 32, his third wife; a onetime
Palm Beach schoolteacher; on grounds of extreme cruelty and
adultery; after six years of marriage, one son; in West Palm Beach,
Fla. The 17-month intermittent trial produced enough testimony
of extramarital adventures on both sides, said the judge, "to make
Dr. Freud's hair curl."
Mrs. Firestone responded to the article with a libel action, the
merits of which were reviewed by the United States Supreme Court
in Time, Inc. v. Firestone.1 The suit presented the Court with the
opportunity again to set forth the appropriate balance between
competing interests inherent in the tort of libel-the protection of
individuals from libelous falsehoods and the first amendment right
of freedom of the press. The balance was last struck in Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc.,2 where the Court held that publications con-
cerning public figures were constitutionally protected if not pub-
lished with actual malice,3 whereas publications concerning private
individuals could result in liability after a finding of fault and
actual injury. The Gertz decision aroused considerable adverse
commentary and the judiciary experienced difficulty in applying its
holdings. 4  Firestone presented an avenue by which the Court
1. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
2. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
3. Actual malice is defined as knowledge of, or reckless disregard for,
the truth. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
In St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1967), the term was further
defined as requiring that a publisher must have entertained serious
doubt as to the truth of his publication. Id. at 731.
4. In El Meson Espanol v. NYM Corp., 389 F. Supp. 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
aff'd, 521 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1975), the court characterized the decision
as "a dangerous and unworkable step backward." Id. at 358-59. Also
critical of the decision are Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188
Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450 (1975); AAFCO Heating & Air Conditioning
Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., - Ind. App. -, 321 N.E.2d 580
(1974); Commercial Programming Unltd. v. Columbia Broadcast-
ing Sys., Inc., 81 Misc. 2d 678, 367 N.Y.S.2d 986 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
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could clarify its position by applying the holdings of Gertz to a
uniquely new fact situation. In particular, the Court was drawn to
consider whether Mary Firestone was a public figure, and if not,
whether fault and actual injury had been shown. Additionally, the
Court was asked to determine the appropriate constitutional stan-
dard for gauging the liability of a publisher of a defamatory, inaccu-
rate report of a judicial proceeding. This note will examine the
Court's handling of these issues.
II. HISTORY
Libel is a tort which provides an individual, whose reputation
has been injured by a publication, a cause of action against the
publisher.5 At common law, the tort was one of strict liability.6
Defamatory or false statements were presumed to be actionable.
To escape liability the defendant had to show that the publication
was either privileged or true."
Prior to 1964, the tort was independent of any specific constitu-
tional limitations.8 However, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,9
the Court began to redefine the dimensions of the tort. There, the
Court held that libelous statements about public officials were not
actionable unless it was shown that the statements had been made
with actual malice. The first amendment was read to mandate this
result in order to avoid self-censorship' and to allow for uninhibit-
ed criticism and debate of public matters.1 ' The application of the
actual malice standard later was expanded to libelous statements
about candidates for public office,' 2 public figures,' 3 and com-
For critical commentary see Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Cen-
sorship, 53 TExAs L. R.v. 422 (1975); Beytagh, Privacy and Free
Press: A Contemporary Conflict in Values, 20 N.Y.L.F. 453 (1975);
Turkington, Foreseeability and Duty Issues in Illinois Torts; Consti-
tutional Limitations to Defamation Suits After Gertz, 24 DE PAUL L.
REv. 243 (1975); The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HAv. L. REv. 41,
139 (1974); Note, 41 BROOKLYN L. REv. 389 (1974).
5. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 112 (4th ed. 1971);
F. POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS 176 (15th ed. 1951).
6. See W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 113.
7. HANSON, LIBEL AND RELATED TORTS f 96 (1969).
8. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961);
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957); Beauharnais v. Illinois,
343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931).
9. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
10. Id. at 279.
11. Id. at 270-71.
12. Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295, 299 (1971); Monitor
Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271 (1971).
13. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967); Associated
Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967).
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ments on matters of public concern by a government employee.
14
Continuing the trend of providing greater constitutional protec-
tion to the press, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,1" a plurality
of the Court held that the actual malice standard attached to any
publication of a matter of public interest. In Gertz, the Court
abandoned the public interest test and limited the actual malice
standard to reports concerning public figures. Additionally, the
Court looked beyond the actual malice standard for the first time
and held that a defamed, private individual could recover only
upon showing fault and actual injury.
The case history of Time, Inc. v. Firestone reflects the constitu-
tional changes that the tort of libel has undergone in recent years.
The Florida Palm Beach Circuit Court announced a $100,000
jury award of damages to Mary Firestone. 6 Before the district
court of appeals, it was found that the publication was a matter of
public interest 17 and that according to Rosenbloom, Time could
not be held liable absent a showing of actual malice. Finding that
Mary Firestone failed to meet this burden, judgment was entered
for Time. On review, the Florida Supreme Court found the actual
malice standard to be inapplicable and thus remanded the suit.' 8
On remand the sympathies of the district court of appeal again
extended to Time.19 This time, the court found the article to be
privileged conditionally under state law because it was a report of a
judicial proceeding.20 It was also reasoned that Time should
prevail because Mary Firestone had failed to prove that she had
suffered injury to her reputation by reason of the publication.-'
The Florida Supreme Court reversed, 22 finding that the report was
not privileged as a judicial report because it was inaccurate.2 3
Moreover it was held that under the recently rendered Gertz
decision, lack of reputational injury was not fatal to the action.24
14. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968).
15. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
16. 305 So. 2d 172, 174 (Fla. 1974).
17. 254 So. 2d 386, 389 (Fla. App. 1971).
18. 271 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1972). The court distinguished between "public
interest" and "public concern." Id. at 749. Rosenbloom was inter-
preted as holding the actual malice standard exclusively applicable
to the latter. The court found the divorce proceedings to be not a
matter of public concern and consequently that constitutional protec-
tion did not attach. Id. at 752.
19. 279 So. 2d 389 (Fla. App. 1973).
20. Florida law provided that a fair and accurate report of judicial pro-
ceeding was conditionally privileged. Id. at 394.
21. Id. at 394.
22. 305 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1974).
23. See note 54 infra.
24. 305 So. 2d 172, 176 (Fla. 1974).
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III. THE ISSUES
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Time contended that the
lower court had erred on several grounds. First, Time asserted
that it could not be held liable absent a showing of actual malice
because Firestone was a public figure.25 Second, it contended that
the actual malice standard applied because the contested pubica-
tion was a report of a judicial proceeding.26 Third, it argued
that because Firestone had not proven injury to her reputation
she had not met the burden of proving actual injury.2 7 The
Supreme Court, in an opinion delivered by Justice Rehnquist,
28
rejected each of Time's contentions. However, the Court found
error in the fact that the Florida courts had not made a defi-
nite determination that Time was at fault. Therefore, the Court va-




Mary Firestone was a prominent figure in Palm Beach society,
a member of the sporting set, and the wife of the scion to an
industrial fortune. She subscribed to a press clipping service from
which she probably received great benefit, as no less than eighty-
eight articles concerning her divorce appeared in various Miami
circulations. During the divorce trial she held press conferences
and the public interest in the proceedings was such that one
Florida court characterized the divorce trial as a "cause celebre."30
1. Prominence or Participation in Controversy
To determine whether Mary Firestone was a public figure, in
light of the foregoing factors, the Supreme Court primarily em-
ployed two tests: (1) whether Mary Firestone had assumed a role
of special prominence in the affairs of society,31 and (2) whether
she voluntarily had involved herself in the resolution of a public
controversy.
32
25. 424 U.S. at 453.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 460.
28. Burger, C.J., and Stewart, Blackmun, & Powell, J.J., joined in the
opinion. Stevens, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of
the case.
29. 424 U.S. at 464.
30. 271 So. 2d 745, 751 (Fla. 1972).
31. 424 U.S. at 453.
32. Id.
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Applying these standards, the Court found that, although Fire-
stone was perhaps prominent in the societal affairs of Palm Beach,
she was not a public figure for having assumed a role of special
prominence in the affairs of society. The Court also found that
she had not become a public figure by voluntarily involving herself
in the resolution of a public controversy. It was reasoned that she
did not fall under this category because her actions were neither
related to a public controversy nor voluntary. This conclusion was
reached by finding that whereas the divorce proceedings may have
been of interest to some readers, they were not a matter of public
controversy. Additionally, it was found that although she had
initiated the divorce suit, her actions were not voluntary because
she was compelled to enter the courtroom to obtain a legal reme-
dy.33 As to the press conferences which she had held during the
divorce proceedings, the Court intimated that these were not so
much voluntary as they were "attempts to satisfy inquiring report-
ers."
34
The majority went on to note, unaccompanied by any prefatory
or explanatory remarks, that Firestone had not assumed "special
prominence in the resolution of public questions. '35  Upon this
and the foregoing findings it was concluded that Firestone was not
a public figure.
2. Selective Application of Gertz
The tests that the Court used in determining the public figure
question were drawn directly from Gertz.36 However, a compari-
son of the definitions announced in Gertz as to what constitutes a
public figure and those used in Firestone reveals that in Firestone
the Court made a selective application of the Gertz tests.
Although difficult to quantify, a composite of the language in
Gertz revealed that there the Court considered two main categories
of public figures to exist. First, there were individuals who be-
cause of their pervasive "fame or notoriety, '3 7 or "power and
influence,"38 or "involvement in the affairs of society, '3 9 became
33. As authority for the proposition that resort to a judicial remedy is
not voluntary, the Court referred to Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371, 376 (1971). In Boddie the Court had held that state denial of
divorce proceedings to indigents violated the due process clause.
34. 424 U.S. at 454 n.3.
35. Id. at 454.
36. Id. at 453-54.
37. 418 U.S. at 351.
38. Id. at 345.
39. Id. at 352.
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public figures for all purposes. Second, those individuals who had
injected themselves or were drawn into the resolution of public
controversies were considered to be public figures when acting
within the realm of the particular controversy. 40 Common to both
the all-purpose and limited-public-figure tests were the elements
that the person had "invite[d] attention and comment" 41 and
assumed "special prominence in the resolution of public ques-
tions."
42
Absent in the Firestone decision was consideration of whether
Mary Firestone had become a public figure by achieving fame or
notoriety in the community. Also absent was whether or not she
had been "drawn" into a public controversy. Similarly, the opin-
ion did not entertain whether she had invited attention or com-
ment.
Whether the Court would have found Firestone not to be a
public figure had a verbatim application of Gertz been used is
unclear. Therefore, Firestone raises the problem of whether it
should be interpreted as eliminating the unused language of Gertz
from future public figure questions, or whether the Court consid-
ered the absent standards as merely equating to those utilized and
hence superfluous. However, there was some indication that Fire-
stone at least eliminated fame or notoriety as a test for determining
public figures. The following illustrates this thesis.
3. What Community?
The majority found Firestone's involvement in Palm Beach
society to be insufficient to satisfy the test of whether she had
assumed a role of special prominence in the affairs of society. As
Palm Beach was Mary Firestone's local community, the Court
appeared to hold that involvement beyond the scope of one's local
community is required to create a public figure under the applied
test. Such a requirement is inconsistent with a careful reading of
Gertz.
In Gertz, both prominence in the affairs of society and fame or
notoriety were described as grounds for finding a person to be a
public figure for all purposes. In determining whether fame or
notoriety was present in Gertz, the Court looked at whether this
had been achieved in the plaintiff's local community.43 If, as the
40. Id. at 351.
41. Id. at 345.
42. Id. at 351.
43. Id. at 352.
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Gertz opinion suggests, fame or notoriety equate with prominence
in societal affairs, it becomes syllogistic that the local community is
the determinative locale as to whether one has assumed prominence
in the affairs of society. Thus, Mary Firestone's prominence in
Palm Beach society would warrant that she be deemed a public
figure. The fact that this result did not obtain suggests not only
that fame or notoriety do not equate with prominence in societal
affairs, but also that Firestone eliminates fame or notoriety as a
viable standard in the public figure question.
Beyond the initial uncertainty as to whether the terms in Fire-
stone parallel those left untouched from Gertz, difficulties arise in
determining what constitutes, "affairs of society," "public contro-
versies" and "public questions." If the local community does not
supply the boundaries for determining whether a person has ob-
tained special prominence in societal affairs, what community or
society should be examined? Firestone provided little guidance on
this point. One can hypothesize that "affairs of society" refers in
some absolute sense to a society larger than that of Palm Beach.
Perhaps a state, regional, or national society is the appropriate
focal point. However, where the line should be drawn is entirely
unclear.
4. Divorce Proceedings
Similarly perplexing is the Court's conclusion that divorce pro-
ceedings are not public controversies. Again the opinion did not ar-
ticulate how this conclusion was reached. In the absence of any
guidelines, the Court created a test subject to the discretionary evils
that Gertz had sought to eradicate.
Gertz replaced the public interest test with the public figure test
for determining when the actual malice standard applied. It did
so because the former test, as a subject matter criterion, gave
judges too much discretion and allowed for ad hoc decision mak-
ing.44 By failing to provide guidelines as to what constitutes a
public controversy, Firestone allowed the problem that Gertz
sought to eliminate once again to emerge. The public controversy
test parallels the public interest test as a subject matter criterion
and in the absence of any direction as to what the test entails,
judges once again are allowed discretion which will result in ad hoc
determinations.
4 5
44. Id. at 346.
45. For similar criticism, see Justice Marshall's dissent, 424 U.S. at 488.
See also 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1131, 1213 (1976).
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Although the majority in Firestone ignored some language
from Gertz, it chose not to ignore consideration of whether Mary
Firestone had assumed special prominence in the resolution of
public questions. The Court's finding in the negative, without
explanation, created the same problems of concreteness already
described with reference to "affairs of society" and "public contro-
versies."
Whereas it is clear that the Court is struggling to define what
constitutes "affairs of society," "public controversy" and "public
questions," this uncertainty works against the constitutional rea-
sons for such standards. The tests are employed to gauge when
the actual malice standard should be invoked. The constitutional
reasons for imposing the actual malice standard are to provide for
uninhibited debate and criticism by the press. 46 Yet it is unlikely
that a prudent publisher will be able to enjoy this breathing space
when the line between who is a public figure and who is a private
individual is so difficult to discern. The fear of guessing wrong is
likely to lead a publisher to exercise a degree of self-censorship, an
additional evil which the public figure category was created to
combat. 47 The net result is that the breathing space that the press
should enjoy has been polluted by uncertainties.
The Court's finding that Mary Firestone had not acted volun-
tarily in initiating the divorce proceedings rested on more settled
ground. Policy considerations support the Court's holding. To
have held that commencement of a suit is a voluntary action,
sufficient to trigger public figure classification when a public con-
troversy is involved, could have gone far toward deterring individu-
als from seeking judicial relief. The increased possibility of non-
compensatory reputational harm which a public figure incurrs is
not a risk which should be engendered solely because one seeks
justice.
5. Public Figure Rationale
The Court's additional finding that Firestone's press confer-
ences were not necessarily voluntary is more tenuous. In Gertz,
one of the specific reasons given for concluding that the plaintiff
was not a public figure was that he had not gone to the press with
his views.48 Thus it would seem that Firestone's press conferences
should have gone far toward drawing her into the public figure
category. By finding otherwise, the Court in Firestone made clear
46. See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
47. See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
48. 418 U.S. at 352.
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that it will not easily find an individual's actions to be of a
voluntary nature so that he or she should be deemed a public
figure.
Also clear from the Court's decision is that the criteria for
determining a public figure are narrower than the underlying
reasons for distinguishing between public figures and private indi-
viduals. In Gertz, the Court reasoned that public figures should
receive different constitutional treatment than private persons be-
cause the former had (a) access to means of rebuttal 49 and (b)
assumed the risk of libelous falsehoods. 50 Utilizing these factors
as the standards for determining who is a public figure, Justice
Marshall, in his dissenting opinion, concluded that Mary Firestone
should have been held to be a public figure.51
Justice Marshall contended that Mary Firestone had sufficient
access to a self-help remedy, evident by the facts that she had held
press conferences and had been the topic of numerous press items
which were "evidently frequent enough to warrant her subscribing
to a press-clipping service. ' 52 Additionally, he argued that by
choosing to be an active member of the sporting set, initiating the
divorce proceedings and voluntarily holding press conferences,
Firestone had. assumed the risk of defamatory injury. Viewing
Firestone as aligned with the reasons for treating public figures
differently than private individuals, he concluded that she was a
public figure.
The dissent evidenced that using the reasons for the public
figure distinction can lead to a result contrary to that reached
under the standards adopted by the majority. By rejecting Justice
Marshall's view and employing different tests for a public figure
question, the majority clearly indicated that access to means of
rebuttal and assumption of the risk were not the standards to be
used in determining who is a public figure. However, the net
result, evident from the divergent results of the majority and the
dissent, is that the reasons supporting the public figure classifica-
tion are much broader than the confines of the class itself. The
imbalance would seem to leave open the possibility of a future need
to either refine the base or relax the tests.
49. Id. at 344.
50. Id. at 345. See also Eaton, The American Law of Defamation through
Gertz v. Welch, Inc., and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L.
REv. 1349, 1419 (1975).
51. 424 U.S. at 484.
52. Id. at 485,
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B. Reports of Judicial Proceedings
Although the Court recently had decided that accurate reports
of judicial proceedings were absolutely privileged,53 the specific
constitutional protection for inaccurate reports had not been decid-
ed. The Court rejected Time's urging that the actual malice
standard automatically should extend to its inaccurate report of
a judicial proceeding.5 Instead, the Court found that the fault
standard was the appropriate test for assessing a publisher's liabili-
ty.
Three main justifications for this holding were offered. First,
the Court reasoned that extending the actual malice standard to
reports of judicial events would create a subject matter criterion, a
type of classification that had been eschewed in Gertz.55 Whereas
53. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
54. Mary Firestone commenced a suit for separate maintenance. Her hus-
band counterclaimed for divorce on grounds of extreme cruelty and
adultery. The divorce court granted the divorce stating:
According to certain testimony in behalf of the defendant,
extra-marital escapades of the plaintiff were bizarre and of
an amatory nature which would have made Dr. Freud's hair
curl. Other testimony, in plaintiff's behalf, would indicate
defendant was guilty of bounding from one bedpartner to an-
other with the erotic zest of a satyr. The court is inclined
to discount much of this testimony as unreliable. Neverthe-
less, it is the conclusion and finding of the court that neither
party is domesticated, within the meaning of that term as used
by the Supreme Court of Florida ....
In the present case, it is abundantly clear from the evi-
dence of marital discord that neither of the parties has shown
the least susceptibility to domestication, and that the marriage
should be dissolved.
That the equities in this cause are with the defendant; that
defendant's counterclaim for divorce be and the same is
hereby granted, and the bonds of matrimony which have here-
tofore existed between the parties are hereby forever dis-
solved.
424 U.S. at 450-51. The court also ordered divorce payments. Time
had reported that adultery was one of the grounds for divorce. The
issue of the accuracy of the report turned on whether such was a basis
for the decree. The Florida Supreme Court twice held that adultery
was not the grounds for the divorce. In reviewing an appeal from
the decree the Court found that judgment had been entered on the
ground of lack of domestication. 271 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1972). Later
in reviewing the libel action the same court stated that extreme cru-
elty was the basis for the decision. It was reasoned that because
Florida law prohibited awarding alimony where adultery was found,
that in view of the fact that alimony was awarded necessarily adultery
could not have been a basis for the divorce and that the report was
false. 305 So. 2d at 178. In deference to the state court findings the
Supreme Court held the article to be inaccurate because it stated that
adultery was one of the grounds for the divorce.
55. See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
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the Court was accurate in noting that the desired expansion would
create a subject matter criterion, it failed to notice that the ration-
ale upon which Gertz premised its disfavor5" was not applicable to
reports of judicial proceedings. A determination of what is a
report of a legal proceeding is not subject to the wide discretion
feared in Gertz. Rather, readily definable standards exist for
classifying judicial reports. Contrary to reports of public interest,
reports of judicial proceedings can be traced to tangible events.
Thus, upon scrutiny, the Court's fears are revealed to be unwar-
ranted and hence not supportive of its finding.
Second, the Court noted that there was little reason to diminish
the constitutional protection against libelous falsehoods that a pri-
vate individual otherwise would enjoy simply because he was party
to a suit. This argument carries more force because decreasing an
individual's chances of recovering for defamatory harm would be
likely to impede justice.
57
Finally, the Court reasoned that the actual malice standard was
not necessary because reports of judicial proceedings most often
would add little to the advancement of uninhibited debate of public
issues. Perhaps this argument is used best when applied to the facts
before the Court, however the strength of the Court's language is
difficult to accord with the importance attributed to reports of
judicial events in previous decisions. Prior Supreme Court deci-
sions recognized that press coverage of judicial proceedings was
essential to enable intelligent voting,58 to guarantee the fairness of
trials"' and to subject the judiciary to public scrutiny and criti-
cism,60 all of which would seem to be public issues.
In a dissenting opinion in Firestone,61 Justice Brennan siezed
these prior decisions to reach the conclusion that judicial reporting
should be protected by the actual malice standard. His thesis was
that the core meaning of the first amendment was that the citizenry
have access to information necessary for self-government. Read-
ing several Supreme Court decisions to place judicial reports within
this core, Justice Brennan argued that a fault standard did not
adequately reflect the constitutional importance of such reports.
56. Id.
57. The Supreme Court's position parallels its posture in deciding that
entering the courtroom is not a voluntary act. See text following note
47 supra.
58. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975).
59. See id.
60. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966).
61. 424 U.S. at 471.
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The majority evidently did not perceive this importance, as it
held that reports which fell both within and outside the core were
to be scrutinized under a standard of fault. However, this dispari-
ty may be illusory in view of the uniqueness of reports of judicial
proceedings. At common law, inaccurate reports of judicial pro-
ceedings were held to result in strict liability.6 The primary
justification for the stringency of this standard was that because
official court records were available to reporters, coverage of judi-
cial proceedings was uniquely susceptible to accurate reporting.6"
In contrast to reports which fall outside the core, but which are
contingent upon futile or fallible modes of investigation, one could
argue that the constitutional importance of judicial reporting is
counterbalanced by their unique circumstance and that an umbrel-
la of fault best accommodates both kinds of reports.
Thus the Court's holding that inaccurate reports of legal pro-
ceedings are governed by a fault standard appears to be a reason-
able compromise of the competing interests of the individual and the
press. The fault standard allows for error in reporting while main-
taining protection for the individual. Public figures involved in
litigation would still fall under the actual malice standard 4 and the
Court even indicated that more narrowly focused reports of judicial
proceedings might receive greater constitutional protection.6 5 At
least the Court has left open the possibility of providing greater
protection to the press in the future.
C. Actual Injury
Having determined that the actual malice standard did not
apply, the Court turned to consider whether the constitutional
limitations on recovery by a libeled private individual had been
satisfied. Gertz had announced that where the actual malice stan-
dard did not attach, a plaintiff could be compensated only for
actual injury. The rationale for this requirement was that the
common law practice of presumed damages operated too harshly
against the press by inhibiting "vigorous exercise of First Amend-
62. Most common law privileges pertaining to reports of judicial proceed-
ings were predicated upon the report being accurate. See 25 Sw. L.J.
800 (1971). Nebraska law follows suit. See Rhodes v. Star Herald
Printing Co., 173 Neb. 496, 113 N.W.2d 658 (1962). In the absence
of truth or a privilege libel becomes a tort of strict liability. See
also notes 6 and 7 supra.
63. See Jones v. Commercial Printing Co., 249 Ark. 952, 463 S.W.2d 92
(1971); Gobin v. Globe Publishing, 216 Kan. 223, 531 P.2d 76 (1975).
64. 424 U.S. at 457.
65. 424 U.S. at 456.
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ment freedoms."0 6  Additionally, disfavor was found with pre-
sumed damages because they allowed juries to award compensation
merely to punish unpopular opinion rather than to compensate
injury actually sustained by reason of the publication."' Compen-
sation only for actual injury was imposed to circumvent these evils.
The Court refused to define actual injury, observing that trial
courts had sufficient experience for framing the issue, but Gertz did
note that:
[T]he more customary types of actual harm .. . include impair-
ment of reputation and standing in the community, personal hu-
miliation, and mental anguish and suffering. Of course, juries must
be limited by appropriate instructions, and all awards must be sup-
ported by competent evidence concerning the injury .... 68
The question that lingered after Gertz was whether proof of
reputational injury was a condition precedent to recovery for per-
sonal humiliation or mental anguish and suffering, or whether the
latter elements alone were sufficient to satisfy the actual injury
requirement.6 9 The issue was squarely presented in Firestone.
The plaintiff had recovered solely on the basis of mental pain and
suffering.7"
The Supreme Court, referring to its language in Gertz, ruled
that reputational injury need not be shown to satisfy the actual
injury standard, and that the grounds upon which Mary Firestone
had recovered were acceptable. It then turned to whether the
award was supportable by competent evidence. Observing that
several witnesses71 had attested to the anxiety experienced by the
plaintiff, the Court held that the actual injury test had been met.
Justice Brennan again differed with the Court's holding. 2 He
argued that proof of injury to reputation was a condition precedent
to recovery for mental pain and suffering. The dissent construed
the Court's decision as a return to allowing presumed damages and
punishment of unpopular opinions.73
66. 418 U.S. at 349.
67. Id.
68. 418 U.S. at 350.
69. See Anderson, supra note 4, at 472 (Reading Gertz as holding reputa-
tional injury to be a condition precedent to recovery); Eaton, supra
note 50, at 1437, (Interpreting Gertz as possibly allowing recovery
without showing injury to reputation).
70. Plaintiff withdrew her claim of injury to reputation prior to the trial.
424 U.S. at 475 n.3 (dissenting opinion).
71. A minister, an attorney, a physician, and several friends of Mrs. Fire-
stone testified to the extent of her anxiety. Evidence also was ad-
duced that she had taken sedatives to try to reduce this tension.
72. 424 U.S. at 471 (dissenting opinion).
73. Additionally, he argued that the Court's holding would eliminate the.
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The dissenter's position lacked merit. He ignored that regard-
less of form, awards for actual injury have to be supported by
competent evidence. This factor controls an argument that the
Court has returned to presumed damages and punishment of mi-
nority views because the awards cannot extend beyond the facts.
The traditional conceptualization of libel is that damage to
reputation is the essence of the tort.1 4 Firestone firmly established
that the tort can exist constitutionally in the absence of such injury.
While removal of this element as a requisite to the tort is likely to
create havoc, 75 objections should be addressed to state lawmakers,
not the Supreme Court. Firestone does not preclude a state from
requiring injury to reputation as an element of the tort. Rather the
Court has given the states the latitude to define the tort.
D. Fault
Gertz threw out the common law rule that libelous utterances
are subject to strict liability. The Court saw this standard as
working too vigorously against the press, because even if a publish-
er took every reasonable precaution to ensure the accuracy of a
publication, he could be held liable if it turned out to be inaccu-
rate.7 0 The Court reasoned that a fault standard should be applied
because it was more accommodating to the competing interests
involved. Thus it was held that as long as liability was not
imposed without fault, the states could decide for themselves the
liability of a publisher who had defamed a private individual.
Gertz had just been decided when the Florida Supreme Court
was entertaining Firestone for the second time. Toward the end of
its opinion on the case the court stated:
[T]his erroneous reporting is clear and convincing evidence of the
negligence in certain segments of the news media in gathering the
news. Gertz v. Welch, Inc., supra.... A careful examination of
the final decree prior to publication would have clearly demon-
strated that the divorce had been granted on the grounds of ex-
treme cruelty, and thus the wife would have been saved the humili-
ation of being accused of adultery in a nationwide magazine. This
is a flagrant example of "journalistic negligence." 77
use of summary judgment procedures in libel actions and thus inhibit
the press by subjecting publishers to the fear of increased litigation
expenses. Id. at 475 n.3. For a treatment of this thesis see Anderson,
supra note 4, at 469 n.218.
74. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 275 (1971).
75. See Eaton, supra note 50 at 1437.
76. 418 U.S. at 346.
77. 305 So. 2d at 178.
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The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Florida
Supreme Court opinion should be read as finding fault on the part
of Time in making its publication. Basically the Court had three
alternatives: (1) to affirm the language of the Florida Supreme
Court as a valid finding of fault, (2) to make a de novo determina-
tion of fault, and (3) to remand for a further determination of
fault. The third was adopted on the grounds that the lower court
opinion did not reveal that a conscious determination of fault had
been made.
7 8
By considering what guidelines the lower court should follow
in making a conscious determination of fault, the concurring and
dissenting opinions revealed that some members of the bench were
willing to go further than the majority in explaining what the fault
standard requires. Justices Powell, Stewart and Marshall agreed
that the rationality of the Time's interpretation of the ambiguous
divorce decree 79 should be a crucial element in determining fault.80
Justices Powell and Stewart also emphasized that the due care
which Time had exercised prior to publication must figure into an
analysis of fault.81 Justice Marshall was willing to go further and
hold that the choice of one of several rational interpretations of an
ambiguous document, without more, was insufficient to support a
finding of fault.
82
Had the Court made an independent determination of fault, the
decision would have gone far toward establishing limits by which
78. 424 U.S. at 484.
79. In relevant part, the divorce decree is quoted in note 54 supra.
80. 424 U.S. at 467-69, 491.
81. 424 U.S. at 465-66. The Time article was composed on the basis of
several sources: a statement by Mrs. Firestone's attorney to a Time
stringer that the divorce had been granted on grounds of adultery and
extreme cruelty, a telephone conversation that the stringer had with
the trial judge, excerpts from the divorce decree which suggested
adultery on the part of both parties, and a wire service dispatch and
New York newspaper article which intimated that the grounds for the
divorce were extreme cruelty and adultery.
82. As authority for this proposition, Justice Marshall relied heavily upon
Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971). 424 U.S. at 490. The decision
dealt with a Time article which had failed to note that it was stating
allegations rather than findings of fact. The Court held that a choice
of one of several rational interpretations of an ambiguous document
was not enough to create a jury issue of actual malice. In Firestone,
Time argued that the rule of the case was that a rational interpretation
of an ambiguous document could not result in liability. The majority
rejected this argument by holding that Pape only applied where the
actual malice standard attached. Because the Court found the actual
malice standard to be not appropriate to the suit, it found Pape to
not be controlling. 424 U.S. at 459 n.4.
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state courts could define fault.8 3 By imposing a requirement of a
conscious determination upon the Florida court, the majority did
not invade the state's providence to define fault. Rather the Court
merely required that the Florida court's reasoning be more than an
apparent afterthought. However, the concurring and dissenting
opinions revealed that, should the lower court overlook the factors
which those justices viewed as important, an appeal might be well-
founded.
IV. CONCLUSION
Time, Inc., v. Firestone, cannot be the final word on the appro-
priate balance between the first amendment and the interests
of the individual. The question of who is a public figure re-
mains largely unresolved. Language narrower than that employed
in Gertz was adopted in Firestone for determining who is a public
figure, however, whether an actual narrowing of the tests has oc-
curred is difficult to discern. The crux of the problem, which
probably will be solved only by future litigation, is what con-
stitutes "affairs of society," a "public controversy," and "pub-
lic questions." In the interim, publishers are best advised to be
wary of their own intuitions of who is a public figure.
A determination of when the actual malice standard would
apply to judicial reports is also unresolved. The decision leaves
one wondering how far the Court will go in regulating the fault
requirement. Although Firestone took the threshold step by re-
quiring a conscious determination of fault, the Court's remand
makes clear that it is not eager to enter this arena. In view of the
path that Firestone has traveled up and down the judicial system,
it would not be surprising if the same suit later provides the impe-
tus for the Court to clarify the issues left unresolved in the 1976
opinion.
Richard J. Butler, '78
83. One of the questions that remains unclear is what fault standard
should be applied: mere, ordinary, or gross negligence. Had the Court
wished to make a de novo determination of fault it would have been
forced to decide.
